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XI.—GEOMETRY AND EEALITY. 
By THOMAS GREENWOOD. 
FOR many centuries, geometry and mechanics had the most 
brilliant fortune as rational sciences. But the discovery of non-
Euclidian geometry, and the momentous revolution brought 
about in the field of natural philosophy during these last years, 
have thrown strong doubts on the self-evidence of the funda-
mental concepts of geometry, and the basic notions of Newtonian 
mechanics. I t is argued now, that only sesthetical considera-
tions and psychological reasons of formal economy and utility 
could justify the privileged position of the axioms of these 
sciences. The practice, for example, of seeing in a distance two 
marked positions on a practically rigid body is something which 
is lodged deeply in our habit of thought. We are accustomed 
further to regard three points as being situated on a straight 
line, if their apparent positions can be made to coincide for 
observation with one eye, under suitable choice of our place of 
observation. If, in pursuance of our habit of thought, we now 
supplement the propositions of Euclidian geometry by the single 
proposition that two points on a practically rigid body always 
correspond to the same distance or line-interval, independently 
of any changes in position to which we may subject the body, 
the propositions of Euclidian geometry then resolve themselves 
into propositions on the possible relative position of practically 
rigid bodies.* 
One is led then to suppose that the truths of geometry and 
mechanics reach a unique level. As Professor Painleve" says, 
there is no essential difference between geometry and mechanics;! 
* Einstein, Relativity, Chap. I. 
t PainlevS, La Micanique. in Mdthode des Sciences, vol. i. 






190 THOMAS GREENWOOD. 
both are experimental sciences, although their developments 
have been different^ the axioms of pure geometry are nothing 
else but the refined form of the properties of natural bodies. 
And Bocher writes: "Geometry becomes the simplest of the 
natural sciences, and its axioms are of the nature of physical 
laws, to be tested by experience and to be regarded as true 
only within the limits of the errors of observation."* 
Professor Einstein has a different opinion, when he writes in 
his book on Relativity that the concept " true " does not tally 
with the assertions of pure geometry, because by the word 
" true " we are eventually in the habit of designating always 
the correspondence with a " real" object; geometry, however, 
is not concerned with the relations of the ideas involved in it 
to objects of experience, but only with the logical connexion of 
the ideas among themselves/)" Poincare- had already said: 
" Geometry is not an experimental science ; experience forms 
merely the occasion for our reflecting upon the geometrical 
ideas which pre-exist within us."J 
And Professor Eddington answering the question whether 
it is true to say that " any two sides of a triangle are together 
greater than the third side," says he is quite unable to say 
whether this proposition is true or not. " I can deduce it," he 
continues," from certain other propositions still more elementary, 
the axioms; if these are true, the proposition is true; if the 
axioms are not true, the proposition is not true universally; 
whether the axioms are true or not, I cannot say, and it is out-
side my province to consider. But for reasons which I do not 
profess to understand, my friend the physicist is more interested 
in Euclidian geometry and is continually setting us problems 
in it."§ 
All these conflicting opinions are unilateral. For the 
* Bulletin Amer. Math. Soe. [2], 2 (1904), p. 124. 
t Einstein, Relativity, Chap. I. 
X "Foundations of Geometry," in Monist, 9 (1899), p. 41. 
§ Eddington, Spaa, Time and Gravitation, Chap. I. 
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contention of physicists that no system of geometry can be taken 
as true is based on the fact that they consider geometry with 
reference to natural phenomena, and fail to take it as an 
independent science, formally irrelevant to a description of the 
universe. We must remember here, thab truth has two aspects: 
a formal and a material aspect. A proposition is said to be 
formally true, either when its terms are not contradictory, or 
when it can be deduced, by means of reasoning, from a coherent 
system of primitive notions and axioms relatively to which it is 
said to be true. The material aspect of truth is of a more 
complex character; for we have to deal here not only with 
thought/but also with facts, that is to say with data of intuition 
and experience. Material truth requires the agreement of 
thinking with experience, while formal truth is caused by the 
self-agreement of thought. I t follows that a proposition can be 
formally true and materially false ; for instance, when we say 
that " the hypervolume of a hypersphere is equal to its volume 
multiplied by one-fourth of its radius " this statement is formally 
true, but it is not verifiable by experience and is therefore 
materially false. This distinction between the two aspects of 
truth is of great importance, because it gives the clue to the 
specific difference between pure geometry and applied mechanics. 
I t will be observed also that we take truth in the scholastic 
sense of adeguatio rei et intdlectHs; but we extend the meaning 
of the word " res " not only to objects of the external world, but 
also to objects created by thought. 
Now, although the ultimate basis of geometry is empirical 
it must be acknowledged that the active rdle of experience 
ceases when the primitive notions and postulates of geometry are 
established. Geometry belongs then to the conceptual order 
and constitutes what is called " axiomatic geometry," a kind of 
hypothetico-deductive system. As such, pure geometry sets 
out from certain primitive notions, such as " point," " straight 
line," " plane," which are not defined and with which we are 
able to associate more or less definite ideas, and from certain 
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simple propositions or axioms, or postulates, which, in virtue of 
these ideas, we are inclined to accept as respecting the laws of 
thought. These axioms state certain relations between the 
primitive notions, which are thus supplemented and universally 
characterized. When, on the basis of a logical process common 
to all sciences, the justification of which we feel ourselves 
compelled to admit, all remaining propositions are shown to 
follow from those axioms, they are proved. 
But if there is no difficulty about the truth of a geometrical 
proposition deduced from a coherent set of axioms, what about 
the truth of the axioms themselves ? This question is unanswer-
able by the methods of geometry; but it is not in itself entirely 
without meaning, as Einstein says. Without going far into the 
essence of geometrical axioms, we can say that they are true 
in so far as they express possible relations between primitive 
notions, undefined in the realm of geometry, but having a 
limited field of indetermination by reason of the intuitive data 
which preside at their formation. Geometrical axioms are true, 
because in the conceptual order, thought binds itself with the 
results of its normal activity. 
The case of physical axioms is different, for they are always 
subject to some discussion and susceptible of being overthrown 
or contradicted by some new discoveries, while geometrical 
axioms are immutable in themselves. The reason of the revisi-
bility of physical postulates lies in the very object of physical 
science. Having observed a series of natural phenomena, the 
physicist has to classify them in order to stabilize his observa-
tions and deduce from them the laws which are to constitute 
science. But the external world does not give our senses any 
presentations of natural laws. Like the ancient Sphynx, nature 
does not give away her secrets: the mind has to guess them. 
How is it done ? How do we proceed successfully from 
particular observations to those universal laws presenting the 
harmony of the universe ? The only way is to form hypotheses 
based on analogies: by an act of imagination, human mind can 
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suppose between the observed facts some possible relations 
which are tried afterwards by means of experimentation. Thus 
Kepler, led by metaphysical considerations, thought that the 
stars must obey certain laws in their motion; and only much 
later was he able to verify that his observations coincided with 
the constructions of his imagination. 
There is no difficulty about the truth of what we observe 
and what we experience because of the simplicity of sense-
perception. The whole question of truth, in physics, lies then 
entirely in the, modality of the hypotheses. Although a 
physical hypothesis is an act of imagination, and therefore 
subject .to the laws of thought, it is by no means a free creation 
of the mind, a convention similar to geometrical axioms. 
For if the latter have only to be coherent between themselves 
in a definite system, and are irrelevant to their actual interpre-
tation, the former must satisfy a further condition, which is 
far more complicated: a physical hypothesis must neces-
sarily lead to the explanation of the group of phenomena 
through which it developed, and also of the new phenomena 
which observation will bring in that group. Nature cannot 
obey the fancies of our imagination; we have to find out her 
own laws and obey them first. If geometry deals with formal 
relations between indefinable concepts without considering the 
content of these concepts, the physicist has especially to care 
about that content itself. He is not at liberty to play with 
mathematical symbols; for he has to struggle with a reality 
which sets limits, wide enough however, to his imagination. 
For instance, the compression of gases is at first propor-
tional to the exerted pressure; but then, parting with its 
mathematical expression, it becomes smaller and smaller. In the 
same way, it is always possible to increase steadily the speed of a 
train; but the stability of the railroad, the strength of the 
materials in use, the structural elements of the engine, impose 
an irrefragable limit upon the practicability of the calculations. 
Then again, mathematics can build up a most wonderful 
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theory of hyperpolyhedra, but there is no matter to which the 
conclusions of such systems can be applied. I t is a truism that 
the science of the possible is infinite; but it is the sanction of 
reality which gives a material value to an hypothesis. 
Let us illustrate with a general example the contrast between 
geometry and physics. By means of the Euclidian geometry 
and the Galilean system of co-ordinates, Newton, considering 
space and time as two absolutes, had been able to give a mathe-
matical expression to his immortal law of gravitation. Now 
the evolution of science has led Professor Einstein to give a 
different law of the universal attraction, by means of 
Minkowski's four-dimensional Universe and Kiemann's generali-
zation of the Gaussian system of co-ordinates. The difference 
of the two laws may be expressed analytically, in polar 
co-ordinates for a particle of gravitational mass, m, as follows: 
Any particle of light pulse moves so that the integral of the 
interval, ds, between two points of its path, in four dimensions* 
is stationary where 
dt,2 = - -y-^T-2 - r W + yd? (Einstein), 
ds2 = -dr3 - r*dQ* + ydt" (Newton), 
considering that y = 1 — 2m/r. 
The two laws differ then by the factor multiplying the term 
dr2. Which corresponds to the external world ? Three crucial 
tests were predicted by Einstein to meet this question : (1) the 
determination of the discrepancy of the perihelion of Mercury, 
(2) the deflection of a ray of light passing near a great mass 
like the sun, (3) the displacement of the lines of the spectrum 
towards the red in a gravitational field. The story of these 
historical tests is well known; with certain restrictions for the 
third one, they all verify Einstein's law, which is then to be 
considered as the true law of gravitation, while Newton's law 
is but a limiting case of Einstein's General Principle of 
Kelativity. 
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But if these laws are considered as logical consequences of 
two hypothetico-deductive systems starting with different 
postulates, both of them are formally true; and their difference 
is but a consequence of the fundamental conceptions underlying 
Newton's and Einstein's mechanics', which, however, in them-
selves are also true. I t is the content of experience, expressed 
by these laws, which influences their material truth. 
The contrast between the methods of geometry and physics 
based on the distinction between formal and material truth, 
shows easily how meaningless is the question of the true 
geometry of the universe. 
From Lobatchefski to Einstein, a long series of mathemati-
cians thought it possible to determine the geometry of the 
universe. Eor them the question: According to -the laws "of 
what geometry do the natural bodies behave ? has a precise 
meaning which could be worked out by experimental tests. In 
other words, the question whether Euclidian, or Lobatchefskian, 
or Eiemannian geometry corresponds to the external world,can be 
answered experimentally, within the limits of errors of observa-
tion. We must only assume that light propagates in a 
straight line, and that every measure of length, whether 
geodesic or astronomical, is to be calculated by means of the 
propagation of light. 
The experiment imagined by Lobatchefski and Bolyai, the 
originators of what Schweikart calls " astral geometry," was 
very simple. By measuring the three interior angles of a large 
triangle, they thought to verify whether that sum is equal, 
less or greater than two right angles. In the first case, 
space would be Euclidian; in the second case, it would be 
Lobatchefskian; and in the third case, it would be Eiemannian. 
And, as Legendre proved it, the verification for one triangle 
must stand good for any other triangle. Gauss had already 
attempted a similar experiment: while Kant was endeavour-
ing to show the psychological character of spatial intuition, 
and deduce its physical meaning, Gauss had undertaken more 
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accurate geodesic measurements of triangulation in the Hartr 
Valley. 
But all these observations proved negative : space presented 
itself as Euclidian. Nevertheless there was an idea amongst 
men of science, that more accurate observations and the 
development of the mechanical consequences of non-Euclidian 
geometry with regard to astronomical problems, would certainly 
favour the legitimacy of non-Euclidian postulates as physical 
hypotheses. This was done by Einstein, when he built up 
his theory of Relativity by means of Eiemann's geometrical 
conceptions. As a matter of fact, without the wonderful 
development of non-Euclidian geometry, Einstein's achieve-
ment would have been impossible. But are we to conclude, 
with him, that the geometry of the universe is not Euclidiarl ? 
This affirmation is simply too bold and premature, for it has 
no real import. And we must confess that Einstein's cosmo-
logical considerations on this topic are the least convincing 
portion of his work. 
Euclidian geometry, says Einstein, must be abandoned, 
because in a system of reference rotating relatively to a system 
at rest, the geometrical behaviour of the bodies, which are 
affected hy the Fitzgerald-Lorentz contraction, does not 
correspond to Euclidian geometry. In simpler words, the path 
of moving bodies in nature is never a Euclidian straight line, 
because of the action of gravitational fields, which is always 
effective; the universe therefore, is not Euclidian. 
The fallacy of this argument is easily seen, if we point out 
that because the path of a moving body is influenced by the 
presence of gravitational fields, it does not follow at all that 
the Euclidian straight line path is not there. As a matter of 
fact, it is there, although not actually followed by the moving 
body. Let us consider for a moment a photograph of the solar 
eclipse of May, 1919. We see plainly the magnificent curve 
described by the rays of light of remote stars passing near the 
sun; but at the same time, we see that there is a Euclidian 
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straight line path between these very stars and the point 
where their rays of light touch the earth. I t is not followed 
by these rays of light, because, according to the Principle of 
I^east Action, the shortest way between two points in a spatio-
temporal continuum is influenced by the presence of gravita-
tional fields. And this is so far true that if the sun, 
which causes the gravitational field in this case, were taken 
further and further away, the path of these same rays of light 
would have a decreasing curvature, thus tending asymptotically 
towards a Euclidian straight line. That path would be adequately 
Euclidian, if per impossibile the sun and all other gravitational 
fields were removed from the universe. 
Another argument familiar to relativists is that the geometry 
of the universe cannot be Euclidian, because Einstein's theory 
is based on Eiemannian geometry, where space is curved and 
the straight line illimited but finite. This argument, however, 
looked through its adequate proportion, means only that 
Eiemann's geometry is more convenient than any other for the 
description of the universe. In fact, there is a principle in the 
theory of groups of transformations, called the Principle of 
Equivalence, which enabled Poincare\ Klein and others to 
transpose any system of metrical geometry into any other. 
By means of a biunivocal correspondence, illustrated with 
an appropriate vocabulary, between two geometries, any 
Eiemannian concept, for instance, is shown to be equivalent to 
a Euclidian concept. I t follows then, that the group of 
natural phenomena explained by the theory of Eelativity can 
be interpreted by means of Euclidian geometry: as axiomatic 
geometry alone makes no affirmations on the reality accessible 
to experience, but only axiomatic geometry completed with 
physical propositions, it is possible, whatever be the nature of 
reality, to keep Euclidian geometry. Geometry [G] does not 
enunciate anything on the behaviour of real objects, but 
geometry together with the sum [P] of physical laws; it is the 
sum [G + P] which can be checked by experience. I t is then 
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always possible to take [G] as Euclidian and make appropriate 
assumptions with reference to some parts of [P]; it is only 
necessary to take the remainder of [P] such as the sum 
[G + P] is in agreement with experience. In the case of 
Belativity, however, it is more convenient and less complicated 
to describe the universe as Eiemannian. Convenience is then 
the condition of the choice of the world's geometry; and 
we must draw the attention to the word " description" in 
physical science, which has the profoundest significance for 
Epistemology.* Because a description is always by means of 
the accidents: the essence of the thing described is left 
untouched by this operation. 
Now we come to the ontological aspect of our-argument. 
With all the essential difference between the object and method 
of geometry and of physics, there must be a close connexion 
between these two disciplines. Because, on the one hand, 
physical sciences cannot reach their actual degree of certitude 
without the help of mathematics, and on the other hand, 
mathematics would be useless if it had no practical value, 
considering also that its origin is empirical. In fact, when 
the thinking person stops to reflect upon the fact that the 
existence of Neptune was pointed out to the astronomer before 
his telescope had noticed this wanderer in the remote heavens; 
when he learns that the mathematician by a theory related to 
the solution of the problem of finding the roots of an algebraic 
equation, is able to say that there are not more than thirty-two 
distinct types of crystals; when he remembers that the existence 
of wireless telegraphy is due to deductions of Maxwell by means 
of theorems that depend upon imaginary quantities; when, to 
give a last instance, he considers that the abstruse non-Euclidian 
geometry of Eiemann and the tortuous theory of absolute 
* D. Wrinch, " On certain Methodological Aspects of the Theory of 
Relativity," in Mind, April, 1922 ; and B. Russell, Introduction to Mathe-
matical Philosophy. 
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differential calculus of Eicci and Levi-Civita enabled Eiostein to 
work out his momentous law of gravitation, which is, as says 
Sir J. J. Thomson, one of the highest achievements of human 
thought; he will undoubtedly endeavour to penetrate this 
mysterious riddle which has perplexed all the great seekers 
of the unknown: How is it possible that geometry and mathe-
matics in general, which are constructions of the human mind, 
independent, in their structure and development, of all 
experience, adapt themselves so wonderfully to the objects of 
reality ? Is Eeason able to discover by its sole activity, the 
very properties of the existing universe ? 
By denying the reality of matter for the benefit of extension, 
Descartes was led to the conclusion that geometry and mathe-
matics in general (because of his invention of analytical 
geometry) are the science of Eeality, the' science which could 
penetrate the ultimate essence of its object; and Nature would 
be completely known when the edifice of mathematics would be 
completed. And the modern style logicist, with all the restric-
tions he makes in the Cartesian doctrine, still holds that Eeason 
is the ruler of things as well as the ruler of thought. For him, 
mathematics, mechanics, physics and every science which uses 
mathematical expressions are a developed aspect of logic; so 
that there is no incompatibility between the laws of chemistry, 
for instance, and the laws of thought, as Leibniz said, Dum Denis 
calculat fit mundus. 
But on the other hand, we must remember that when 
the mathematician tries his creative power of imagination 
on ideal constructions, he does not think of any practical 
utilization of the results he obtains. While to the physicist 
mathematical systems are operators enabling him to act more 
successfully on matter, to the mathematician the construction 
of an abstract theory is an end in itself independently of its 
applications. As Professor Bouasse says, the creator of new 
mathematical forms does not care whether his inventions 
correspond to some reality. The forms in themselves interest 
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him more than anything else, for they enlarge the ready-
reckoner of mathematical forms. I t is another question 
whether in a near or remote future, physical phenomena will 
consent to lodge in those structures. The algebraist prepares in 
advance sets of moulds which will be utilized by the physicist 
according to his convenience. But he does not think of that 
convenience when he makes them ; although history shows us 
that many times the solution of a physical problem has led 
physicists to invent new mathematical forms, as for example, 
when the ideas of Faraday led Maxwell to the mathematical 
exposition of the electromagnetic theory. 
The independence of mathematicians towards reality is 
Bhown by the fact that a great number of mathematical and 
specially of geometrical constructions do not find or rather 
cannot have a corresponding reality. We 1iave mentioned the 
theory of hyperpolyhedra which has no application in nature. 
In the same way it is impossible to give an adequate geome-
trical description of a flower. Nature is far more complicated 
than geometry and mathematics; so that if we are to describe the 
external world, mathematics must be supplemented with qualita-
tive principles. I t is certain then that mathematics are not at all 
co-extensive with reality: On the one hand, reality outruns them 
by its imprevisibility; and on the other hand, it is overstepped 
by them by all the distance between existence and possibility. 
However, it is always possible to reconcile the real with 
that overwhelming creation of virtual relations. For Reason, 
however disinterested one may think it, has a utilitarian 
function. With the same activity, reason deduces a pro-
position from other propositions, and relations between natural 
phenomena. If quantitative relations, which are the object 
of mathematics, agree with the laws of nature as well as 
with the laws of thought, it is because of the conformity of the 
order in nature and the order in thought. We are adapted to 
our environment, to the world in which we live, in such a way 
as to make possible not only our material living, but also our 
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intellectual development. Neither our sensible organs, nor our 
intellect could attain their normal development it' there were 
an incompatibility between human mind and the external 
world, if our previsions, based on undeniable observations, led 
us to untrue conclusions with regard to similar observations. 
If science is power, it is because our reason, in its attempt to 
comprehend nature, gives us thereby the necessary means to act 
on it. We are therefore convinced that the universe has 
its laws and- that we are able to penetrate them; we are 
convinced that the external world cannot change its laws, in the 
same way as we cannot change the laws of thought; we feel, so 
to speak, that Eeality binds us with it, in an insuperable circle. 
In this stage of reflection, the thinker has to face a last 
aspect of the problem, which is by far the most alarming. If 
the alliance between mathematics and physics is undeniable, 
does science explain things as they are ? Are science and 
reality identical? The great physicist, Duhem, denied that 
science can explain everything. For him, a physical theory i3 
but an attempt towards a symbolic representation of Eeality, 
and not an explanatory inquiry about the real. " A physical 
theory," he states, " is an abstract system which sums up and 
classifies logically a group of experimental laws, without pre-
tending to explain them."* An eminent mathematician and 
philosopher, Professor Le Eoy, goes further, when he says that 
not only physical theories are symbolic and conventional, but 
that scientific facts themselves are mere creations of our 
mind. For him, science is made up of conventions, whence 
its apparent truth. But scientific facts, and a fortiori scientific 
laws, are artificial creations of the scientist himself. Science, 
therefore, cannot teach us anything about reality; it can only 
be used as a rule of action. 
"We could hardly expect any other from a distinguished 
follower of Bergson. Yet at the same time we maintain that it 
* Duhem, La Thiorie Physique : Sa Structure. 
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is impossible for science to be anti-intellectualistic : science must 
be intellectualistic, or it will not be at all. We take science as 
a logical classification of facts, as a means of putting together 
certain observations which are apparently separated, although 
they are really linked by some hidden but natural necessity. 
But a logical classification is an explanation by the natural 
causes; because its object is not to reveal to us any order in 
nature, save the order existing in things, the intimate relations 
between objects of reality ; if possible the plan of nature itself. 
I t is not the privilege of reason to create physical laws, but 
only to utilize them when discovered. We cannot pretend 
however, that science gives us the comprehension of the true 
essence of things. If we get every day nearer and nearer to 
the knowledge of reality, we must confess at the same time, 
that we are still, with respect to the ultimate mechanism of 
things, in the position of an engineer towards a machine of 
which a few organs only are visible, the remainder being still 
inaccessible to him. The reason of our ignorance is simple: 
it is the materiality of human means of perception, which 
hinders our comprehension of the ultimate nature of things. 
Besides, whatever has relations to things distinct from itself, 
could not be what it is, if those different things did not exist; 
and therefore we cannot know a thing as it is, unless we know 
all its relations to all the other things in the universe. We 
cannot hope then to penetrate adequately the essence of 
things, although we must be convinced, with the great 
mineralogist Lapparent, that science progresses by successive 
approximations towards an adequate explanation of the 
relations between sensible things. Scientific certitude may 
be considered as asymptotic, because of the hypothetical 
character of scientific theories. Science and reality are not, 
therefore, congruent: the evolution of our knowledge and the 
nature of things are in the relation of a science-curve to its 
reality-asymptote. 
But at the same time, we must acknowledge that every day 
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we make a new conquest over the unknown, which remains for 
us a definite acquisition. Although scientific theories cannot be 
looked upon as an adequate knowledge of Nature,. because 
Keality is necessarily refracted by the mental factors of our 
general constructions, yet our knowledge of particular facts and 
even of limited groups of facts related between themselves, can 
be materially true, independently of the scientific theories with 
which they may agree. If then, the evolution of the various 
physical theories from the early Greek philosophers up to the pre-
sent day seems to prove a constant failure of theoretical science, 
we must realize that, amongst what are considered to be ruins in 
an old' physical theory, there remains a certain invariant which 
makes the very value of the new theories. Light, for instance, 
is subject to gravitation; Newton knew it and gave the figures 
for the deflection of rays of light grazing the sun. Einstein, by 
means of a new theory, corrects Newton's formula, as we know. 
But whatever be the exact amount of that deflection, whatever 
be the primitive assumptions of the theories predicting that 
deflection, the fact is there; the deflection of the rays of light 
•grazing the sun is an invariant which subsists whatever be the 
fortune of the physical systems which try to account for it. 
So, by calling a fact "desoxydation" or "phlogistication" 
we do not change the fact as such: its expression only is 
altered. The same again, we may call a geometrical entity a 
" Euclidian circumference " or a " Eiemannian straight line " in 
the antipodal system, without altering its very nature. In other 
words, the essence of a thing does not change when its meaning 
is expressed in English, in French or in German. 
We do not go, however, as far as to say that science is a 
well-made language, as Locke contends; for us, science is not 
only a nominalistic system of coherent relations between 
indefinables, but the expression of true relations between real 
objects. Sensible things, for which the word " object" has been 
invented, are really objects and not fugitive and unseizable 
appearances. When we ask then what is the value of science, 
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we do not mean does science enable us to comprehend the very 
essence of things, but does it enable us to understand the true 
relations of things ? And science has lived long enough to 
prove the stability of its particular constructions. As Poincare" 
says, through the evolution of scientific systems, there is some-
thing which is always there, always present, definitely acquired, 
and that something is the essential. 
It could not be otherwise. For changes do not happen in the 
laws of nature or in natural facts, but in the way in which we 
conceive and express them. Reality is immutable; our 
interpretations of it are, however, conditioned by the necessity 
and the adequacy of the data on which we base our solutions. 
One may argue here that, if the world is rational, we ought not 
to make mistakes in the expression of its laws. But if we know 
thoroughly the laws of our mind, we are not quite sure about the 
laws of nature. The materiality of our being is an obstacle to 
our immediate knowledge of things as they are. We have to 
reason first about appearances, and, naturally, commit errors. 
Our convictions, even reasoned, are not a sufficient guarantee 
of truth. 
We conclude, then, by saying, that science has a value 
independently of our reason. The reality of the external world 
is certainly independent of the eyes which see it, of the hands 
which touch it, of thought itself. Reality is not created in 
and by empirical experience; it exists ready-made outside and 
prior to" experience. In thab sense, we can say that the content 
of science is reality. So that if, per impossibile, mankind were 
annihilated, science would undoubtedly disappear as such. But 
its content would still be there; nature would continue its 
performance according to the same laws; the spectators only 
would be missing. 
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